We investigate the following finding concerning the order in which participants are men tioned in sentences: In a probe recognition task, probe words are responded to considerably more rapidly when they are the names of the first-as opposed to the second-mentioned participants. Seven experiments demonstrated that this advantage is not attributable to the tendency in English for first-mentioned participants to be semantic agents; neither is it due to the fact that in many of our experiments, the first-mentioned participants were also the initial words of their stimulus sentences. Furthermore, the advantage is not attenuated when the first-and second-mentioned participants share syntactic subjecthood, or even when the first-mentioned participants are not the syntactic subjects. In sum, the effect does not appear to be attributable to linguistic factors. We suggest instead that it is the result of cognitive proc esses: Building a coherent mental representation requires first laying a faun· dation and then mapping subsequent information onto the developing representation. First· mentioned participants are more accessible because they form the foundations for their sentence.Jevel representations and because it is through them that subsequent information gets mapped onto the developing representations. � 1988 Academic Press. Inc.
Primacy effects are frequently docu mented in the psychological literature. They emerge in domains varying from im pression formation-attributes encoun tered first figure more prominently in the impression that is formed of a novel person (Srull & Wyer, 1979) -to verbal learning items presented first in a list have the high est probability of being remembered (Mur dock, 1962) .
In this paper we investigate a very robust primacy effect. We believe that this effect says something about how people construct mental representations of sentences. We admit, however, that when we first ob served the effect, we considered it more a nuisance than a finding. Perusing the liter ature, we discovered that a handful of other researchers had observed the same effect, considered it in the same light, and there fo re mentioned it only in passing.
The effect emerges from the following experimental task: Subjects read or hear a series of sentences, and at some point, they read or hear a probe word. Their job is sim ply to verify whether the probe word oc curred in the previous material, and their verification latencies compose the depen dent variable (Caplan, 1972; Chang, 1980; Corbett & Chang, 1983; McKoon & Rat cliff, 1980) . One of us recently used this task as a tool for understanding how comprehenders deal with anaphora (Gernsbacher, 1988) . The stimulus sentences in that study always in volved two participants who were initially referred to by first names (e.g., Tina, Lisa), and often re-referred to by anaphoric pro nouns. After reading each sentence, sub jects respond to a probe word, which on the experimental trials was the name of one of the two participants.
Across six experiments, several factors were manipulated that affected how smoothly subjects comprehended the ana phoric pronouns. Yet, despite these various manipulations, and in addition to the vari ous results observed about anaphora, the following effect appeared again and again: Names of the first-mentioned participants were responded to dramatically faster-an average 60 ms faster-than names of the second-mentioned participants.
We were preceded in this discovery by Corbett and Chang (1983) and Von Eck hardt and Potter (1985) . We want to point out that Corbett and Chang (1983) reported the same effect even though they included fi ller trials in which the probe words were words other than participant names. So the effect does not depend on subjects explic itly monitoring for the names of sentence participants .
STRUCTURE BUILDING AND ORDER

OF MENTION
One explanation of this effect is based on the framework described by Gemsbacher (1984; 1985) . According to this framework, the goal of comprehension is to build a coherent mental representation or "struc ture" of the information being compre hended. To build this structure, the com prehender first lays a fo undation based on the information he or she initially receives. After laying the foundation, the compre hender develops the structure. If incoming information is congruent with or related to the previous information, it is mapped onto the developing structure. However, if the incoming information is less congruent, it is less likely to be mapped onto the develop ing structure. Instead, the comprehender might shift and initiate a substructure branching off fr om the original structure. Thus, the mental representation of the en tire stimulus usually comprises several sub structures.
Presumably, laying a foundation con sumes cognitive capacity that should be manifested behaviorally in increased com prehension time. A large body of converg ing data supports this assumption. For in stance, word-by-word reading times dem onstrate that the initial words of a sentence take longer to read than subsequent words (Aaronson & Ferres, 1983; Chang, 1980) . In fact, the same word is read more slowly when it occurs at the beginning of a sen tence or phrase than when it occurs at the end (Aaronson & Scarborough, 1976) .
Similarly, sentence-by-sentence reading til\leS demonstrate that initial sentences of a paragraph take longer to read than subse quent ones (Cirilo , 1981; Cirilo & Foss, 1980; Glanzer, Fischer, & Dorfman, 1984; Graesser, 1975; Haberland!, 1980 Haberland!, , 1984 Haberlandt, Berian, & Sandson, 1980; Haberland! & Bingham, 1978; Olson, Duffy, & Mack, 1984) . This effect is ob served regardless of where the paragraph's topic sentence occurs (Greeno & Noreen, 1974; Kieras, 1978, 198 1) . In addition, the first sentence of a story's subepisode or constituent takes longer to read than other sentences in the constituent (Haberland!, 1980 , Haberlandt et a! ., 1980 Man dler & Goodman, 1982) .
Finally, with auditory comprehension, latencies to detect a target phoneme or word are also longer when the target occurs during the beginning of a sentence or phrase than later (Cairns & Kamerman, 1975; Cutler & Foss, 1977; Foss, 1969; Hakes, 197 1; Marslen-Wilson et al., 1978; Shields, McHugh, & Martin, 1974) .
All of these data display the pattern ex pected if comprehenders use initial stimuli (words or sentences) to lay a foundation for their mental representations of phrases, sentences, story constituents, or para graphs. But this pattern is not displayed when the stimuli do not lend themselves to coherent mental representations-for ex ample, when the sentences or paragraphs are self-embedded or extensively right branching (Foss & Lynch, 1969; Greeno & Noreen, 1974; Hakes & Foss, 1970; Kleras, 1978 Kleras, , 1981 .
In addition, sentences are recalled better when cued by their first content words or by pictures of those first content words than when cued by later occurring words (Bock & Irwin, 1980; Prentice, 1967; Turner & Rommetveit, 1968) ; similarly, ORDER OF MENTION 701 story constituents are recalled better when cued by their first as opposed to later oc curring sentences (Mandler & Goodman, 1982) . Such data support the proposal that initial stimuli form the foundation onto which subsequent information is added. In fact, initial stimuli play such a fundamental role in organizing mental structures that when asked to recall the main idea of a paragraph, subjects are most likely to select the initial sentence even when the actual theme is a later occurring sentence (Kieras, 1980) . We suggest that the processes involved in building mental structures-in particular, the processes of laying a foundation and mapping subsequent information onto that fo undation-underlie the primacy effect we spoke about earlier: Participants mentioned first in a sentence are more accessible than participants mentioned second . This is be cause fo undations can be based only on the information that comprehenders initially re ceive; thus, first-mentioned participants serve as the fo undation for their sentence level representations. In addition, after a fo undation is laid, subsequent information must be mapped onto that foundation. Thus , first-mentioned participants achieve even more accessibility because it is through them that subsequent informa tion-including information about the sec ond-mentioned participants-becomes rep resented.
To reiterate, we propose that the greater accessibility of first-mentioned participants is a function of the way that comprehenders build their mental structures: First mentioned participants form the foundation of sentence-level representations, and therefore the remainder of the sentences is represented vis-a-vis those initial partici pants.
Our proposal resembles the following idea advanced by MacWhinney (1977) in a paper aptly titled, Starting Points: "The speaker uses the first element in the English sentence as a starting point for the organi zation of the sentence as a whole. Similarly, the listener uses the first element in a sentence as a starting point in comprehen sion. Both the speaker and the listener seem to use special techniques for attaching the body of the sentence to the starting point" (p. 152).
However, there are other reasons why first-mentioned participants might be more accessible. For instance, it may well be a manifestation of the linguistic structure of English: First-mentioned participants in de clarative sentences are virtually always the syntactic relation known as "subj ect," and typically also the semantic role considered "agent." Our goal in the present research was to untangle linguistic and other factors from a factor we called simply "order of mention ."
To do this, we conducted seven experi ments using the laboratory task described above. That is, subjects read sentences about two participants, and after each sen tence, they rapidly verified whether a probe word had occurred.
E XPERIMENT I
The first factor that we wanted to untan gle from order of mention was semantic role. In all our previous studies, the fi rst mentioned participants were always their sentences' agents. Perhaps the effect we observed for order of mention was actually an effect of agency. Agents might gain a privileged place in comprehenders' mental representations because of several linguis tic and psycholinguistic reasons. Experi mental data suggest that agents tend to be more animate (Clark, 1965; Johnson, 1967) , more active (Osgood, 197 1) , more imagin able (James, 1972; James , Thompson, & Baldwin, 1973) , more positively evaluated (Johnson, 1967) , and so forth. Because of these characteristics, several theorists have suggested that agents are more likely to at tract attentional fo cus (Zubin, 1979) , stim ulate empathy (Kuno & Kabaraki, 1977) , and match the speaker or listener's per spective (MacWhinney, 1977) . Descriptive data also suggest that agents are more likely to be their sentences' subjects (Greenberg, 1963 ), topics (Giv6n, Ed., 1983 , and themes (Tomlin, 1983) .
In sum, on many dimensions, agents hold an advantage over patients. Given that only rarely (outside of psycholinguistic experi ments) are agents not first mentioned, it could well be that the effect we observed for order of mention is really an effect of agency.
We investigated this possibility in Exper iment I by manipulating two variables: se mantic role, whether the probe words were the names of the agents versus the patients, and order of mention, whether the probe words were the names of the first-versus the second-mentioned participants. In other words, we took advantage of the ac tive versus passive construction in English.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 96 under graduates at the University of Oregon. Like all the subjects in the following experi ments, they were native English speakers who participated in return for course credit or pay.
Materials and design. We constructed 32 sentence sets; an example appears in Table  I . Each sentence set comprised four ver sions of a prototype sentence. In two of the four versions, the probe names were the agents (AGT) and either the first-or sec ond-mentioned participants. We shall refer to these two versions as AGT I and AGT 2, respectively. In the other two versions, the probe names were the patients (PAT) and either the first-or second-mentioned partic ipants. We shall refer to these two versions as PAT I and PAT 2, respectively .
Like the example shown in Table I , all 32 sentence sets had the structure, NP1 Ved NP2 Adverbial, when the agents were the first-mentioned participants, and NPt was Ved by NP2 Adverbial when the agents were the second-mentioned participants. The adverbials were five-word temporal or locative phrases.
Two common, American, first names were randomly assigned to each sentence set. As in all the experiments reported here, the two names were matched for gender, perceived familiarity, and relative length (in number of characters and syllables). Across all experimental sentences, half the names were stereotypically female, and half were stereotypically male. But within each sentence, the two names were stereo typic of the same gender. One name of each pair was randomly selected as the probe name.
Thirty-two lure sentences were con structed whose probe names had not oc curred in their respective sentences. The lure sentences resembled the experimental sentences in syntactic fo rm: Half (16) were in the active voice, and half were in the passive voice.
To ensure adequate comprehension and to encourage subjects to attend to all as pects of the sentences (not just the partici pants' names), each experimental sentence was followed by a two-alternative WH question. A third of the questions asked about the temporal or locative setting of the action (i.e., the adverbial) . For example, for the sentence set given in Table I Four material sets were fo rmed by ran domly assigning one of the fo ur versions of each sentence set to each material set. Therefore, across the fo ur material sets, each prototype sentence occurred in all fo ur of its versions. But within each mate rial set, each prototype sentence occurred in only one of its four versions. There were eight different AGT I, AGT 2, PAT I, and PAT 2 type sentences in each material set. Twenty-four subjects were randomly as signed to each material set; in this way, each subject was exposed to only one ver sion of a sentence set.
Procedure. A trial began with a warning signal, which was a plus sign appearing for 750 ms in the center of the screen. After the warning signal disappeared, each word of the sentence appeared (also in the center of the screen). The display time for each word was a fu nction of its number of characters plus a constant. The constant was 300 ms and the function was 16.667 ms per charac ter. The interval between words in the sen tences and between the last word in each sentence and its probe name was 150 ms. The probe names appeared in capital letters at the top of the screen and remained on the screen until the subjects responded or 3 s elapsed. Subjects responded by pressing one of two response keys; one was labeled "yes," the other labeled "no."
For each experimental sentence, 250 ms fo llowing the offset of the probe name, the word Test appeared toward the bottom of the screen to warn subjects of an upcoming comprehension question. This warning sig nal remained on the screen for 750 ms, after which the comprehension question ap peared and, below it, two answer choices. One answer choice was positioned toward the left side of the screen, and the other toward the right side. Subjects pressed the left-most response key to select the answer on the left or the right-most response key to select the answer on the right. The correct answer choices appeared equally often on each side of the screen. The questions and answer choices remained on the screen un til either the subjects responded or 10 s elapsed. After responding, the subjects were given fe edback about their accuracy.
Subjects responded with their dominant hand, using their index finger to press one key and middle finger to press another key. Subjects were replaced if they failed to meet the following criteria: 90% accuracy at responding to experimental probe names (requiring a "yes" response), 90% accu racy at responding to lure probe names (re quiring a "no" response), and 75% accu racy at answering the two-choice compre hension questions.
Results
The means of the subjects' average cor rect responses are graphed in Fig. I . These average response times were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOV A), as were the average response times for each sentence set. The results we report are based on the minF' statistic (Clark, 1973) . feet of order of mention: First-mentioned participants were responded to 54 ms faster than second-mentioned participants, minF'(l,99) = 8.940, p < .005. The main effect of semantic role was not reliable, minF'(l ,89) = .44; neither was the interac t . "Jn between the two variables, minF' �.,127) = 1.060, p > .25. Although the statistical interaction was not reliable, the data hinted that the first mentioned participants' advantage might be weaker for the patients (42 ms) than the agents (67 ms). And, although we felt con fident in our sample sizes of 96 subjects and 48 sentences, we entertained the possibility that we might be prematurely accepting the null hypothesis. So, as a conservative mea sure, we conducted the fo llowing replica tion experiment.
Experiment 2: Replication
We tested an additional 120 subjects us ing the same materials and procedures as we used in Experiment I. We analyzed the data in the same fa shion, and the results were identical. The interaction between or der of mention and semantic role was still not reliable according to conventional stan dards, minF'(I,89) = 2.138, p > .10. Nei ther was the main effect of semantic role, minF'(I, 155) = 0.68. In contrast, the main effect of order of mention was again highly reliable: First-mentioned participants were responded to 76 ms faster than second mentioned participants, minF'(I, 143) = 30.47, p < .00001.
From the results of Experiments I and 2, we draw two simple conclusions: First, comprehenders' mental representations must be constructed in such a way that first-mentioned participants are reliably more accessible than second-mentioned participants. Second semantic role does not appear to be the factor underlying the ad vantage. In other words, the greater acces sibility of fi rst-mentioned participants is not because of their tendency to be agents in English sentences.
ExPERIMENT 3
The second fac tor that we wanted to un tangle from order of mention was what we shall call roughly "initial position in the sentence." In all the experiments in which we observed an advantage of first mention, the first-mentioned participants were also the first words of their respective sen tences. We wondered whether that was the basis of their advantage. If so, it was pos sible that our laboratory paradigm was ac centuating this effect, given that the first word of each sentence was always pre ceded by an attention-getting warning sig nal, which was itself preceded by a brief blank period .
So in Experiment 3 we investigated whether the first-mentioned participants' advantage arose simply from their occur ring as the initial words in their stimulus sentences. (We admit this was one of our less interesting hypotheses, but it clearly deserved investigation.) We investigated this by manipulating the position of an ad verbial phrase in an active sentence. The adverbials were preposed (at the beginning of the sentences), postposed (at the end of the sentences), or they did not occur at all. When the adverbials were preposed, the first-mentioned participants were no longer the initial words of their sentences. But they regained that status when the adverbi als were postposed or omitted. Again we manipulated order of mention, whether the probe names were the first-versus second mentioned participants.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 96 under graduates at the University of Oregon.
Materials and design. We constructed 48 sentence sets; an example appears in Table  2 . Each sentence set comprised six ver sions of a prototype sentence. In two of the six versions, the adverbial phrases were preposed (PRE), and the probe names were either the first-(PRE I) or second-(PRE 2) mentioned participants. In two other ver- sions, the adverbials were postposed (POST), and the probe names were either the first-(POST I) or second-(POST 2) mentioned participants. In the remaining two versions, there were no adverbial phrases (ZERO), but again the probe names were either the first-(ZERO I) or second (ZERO 2) mentioned participants.
Like the example in Table 2 , all 48 sen tence sets had the structure, [Adverbial] NPt Ved NP2 NP3 [Adverbian. NP1 was always an agent/subject while NP2 was a recipient/direct object (i.e., a promoted in direct object). NP3 was an inanimate object described by a five-word phrase. The ad verbials were always three-word locative or temporal phrases.
Forty-eight lure sentences were con structed in which the probe names had not occurred in their respective sentences. The lure sentences resembled the experimental sentences in syntactic fo rm: A third had preposed adverbials, a third had postposed adverbials, and a third were without adver bials.
Six material sets were formed by ran domly assigning one of six versions of each sentence set to a material set. Across the six material sets, each prototype sentence occurred in each of its six versions. Within each material set, there were eight different PRE I, PRE 2, POST I, POST 2, ZERO I, and ZERO 2 type sentences . Sixteen sub jects were randomly assigned to each ma terial set, and in this way, each subject was exposed to only one version of a sentence set.
To ensure adequate comprehension and to discourage subjects from selectively at tending to parts of the sentences, each ex perimental sentence was followed by a two alternative WH-question. A third of the questions asked about the identity of the transferred item. (For example, such a question for the sentence set shown in Ta ble 2 would be, "What did Tina mail to Lisa?") . Another third asked about the ad verbial (e.g., "When did Tina mail Lisa a box fu ll of clothes?"). And the final third asked about the identity of the agent or re cipient (e. g., "Who was mailed a box full of clothes?" or "Who mailed a box full of clothes?").
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment I.
Results
The means of the subjects' average cor rect response times are graphed in Fig. 2 ANOV A revealed a reliable main effect of adverbial position, minF'(2, 196) = 8.054, p < .0001. When we examined this effect further, we discovered that it was due to response times being slower when the ad verbials were postposed (M = 975 ms) rather than either preposed (M = 924 ms) or omitted (M = 922 ms) [minF'(I ,87) = 9.805, p < .005, for the POST versus PRE comparison; minF'(l,98) = 11.34, p < .005, for the POST versus ZERO compari son; but minF'(I ,47) = 0.06, for the PRE versus ZERO comparison]. This effect most likely reflects some awkwardness that subjects experienced with the postposed constructions: The double object construc tions-the adverbials following a five-word inanimate direct object phrase-seem to force the adverbials into an aposition sta tus .
More interestingly, the original ANOV A also revealed a reliable main effect of order of mention: First-mentioned participants were responded to 69 ms fa ster than sec ond-mentioned participants, minF'(I, 107) = 18.85, p < .0001. Order of mention did not, however, interact with adverbial posi tion: That is, the advantage held by first mentioned participants was statistically equivalent despite the position or occur rence of the adverbials, minF'(2,94) = 0.73.
However, despite the fa ilure of the inter action to reach statistical significance, we were again in a situation like Experiment I where numerically the data hinted that the first-mentioned participants' advantage might be somewhat weaker in one condi tion-namely, the preposed condition when the first-mentioned participants were not the initial words of their sentences. So again, to avoid prematurely accepting the null hypothesis, we conducted a replication experiment.
Experiment 4: Replication
We tested an additional 120 subjects us ing the same materials and procedures as we used in the original experiment. The resuits were identical. The interaction be tween adverbial position and order of men tion was still not statistically reliable, minF'(2,221) = 0.590. But like the original experiment, each of the main effects was. The main effe ct of adverbial position, minF'(2,192) = 3.593, p < .05, was again due to response times being slower when the adverbials were postposed (M = 909 ms) rather than either preposed (M = 884 ms) or omitted (M = 875 ms) [minF'(I ,94) = 3.856, p < .07, fo r the POST versus PRE comparison; minF'(l,98) = 6.022, p < .025, for the POST versus ZERO compari son; but minF'(I,97) = 0.51, for the PRE versus ZERO comparison]. And, more im portantly, the main effect of order of men tion, minF'(1,148) = 50.87, p < .00001, was due to first-mentioned participants be ing responded to 74 ms fa ster than second mentioned participants.
The conclusions we draw from Experi ments 3 and 4 are straightforward. First, the advantage we observed for first mentioned participants suggests that com prehenders' mental representations are constructed in such a way that first mentioned participants are reliably more accessible than second-mentioned partici pants. Second, this advantage is not depen dent on the first-mentioned participants be ing the initial words of their sentences. The advantage must depend more on each par ticipant's position relative to the other par ticipant.
ExPERIMENT 5
In our previous experiments, including the first four experiments reported here, the first-mentioned participants were al ways their sentences' syntactic subjects. This is the normal situation in a relatively strict SVO (Subject-Verb-Object) language such as English (Greenberg, 1963) . How ever, in Experiments 5, 6, and 7, we at tempted to tease apart the effects of order of mention from those of subjecthood. We did this in Experiment 5 by having the two participants share subjecthood, as opposed
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to the first-mentioned participants being the sole subjects. In other words, our sen tences had conjoined-subject construc tions, as in ( 1) Tina and Lisa argued during the meeting.
as opposed to single-subject constructions, as in
(2) Tina argued with Lisa during the meeting.
Our stimulus sets comprised three types of sentences. The first type was built around what we called lexical reciprocal verbs. These verbs described actions in which the two participants engaged in mu tually complementary actions, and both participants were agents. For example, ar gue, debate, and converse are lexical recip rocal verbs. In the conjoined-subject con dition, both participants were subjects, as in sentence (1) above. In the single-subject construction, as in (2) above, fi rst mentioned participants were subjects, and second-mentioned participants were ob jects of the preposition with.
The second type of sentences in our stim ulus sets involved reciprocal anaphors. These sentences contained transitive verbs that could occur with reciprocal anaphoric expressions such as each other or one an other as direct objects. When used this way, both participants were subjects; as in (3) Tina and Lisa annoyed one another at the conference.
However, when used without the recipro cal anaphoric expression, first-mentioned participants were agents/subjects while sec ond-mentioned participants were patients/ direct objects, as in (4) Tina annoyed Lisa at the conference.
The third type of sentences, the comita tives, contained simple intransitive verbs that did not involve reciprocal actions. When used in a conjoined-subject construc tion, the verbs connoted that the two participants acted simultaneously, but not re ciprocally. An example is (5) below.
(5) Tina and Lisa hiked in the mountains.
To summarize, in Experiment 5, we ma nipulated two variables: subject status, whether the probe names were conjoined versus single subjects, and order of men tion, whether the probe names were the first-versus second-mentioned partici pants.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 120 under graduates at the University of Oregon.
Materials and design. For each of the three sentence types, we constructed 24 sentence sets. An example sentence set for each type is shown in Table 3 . For the Lex ical Reciprocal and Reciprocal Anaphor sentences, each sentence set comprised four versions of a prototype sentence. In two of the four versions, the probe names occurred as conjoined subjects and as ei ther the first-(CONJ I) or second mentioned participants (CONJ 2). In the other two versions, the probe names oc curred as single subjects and as either the first-(SING I) or second-mentioned partic ipants (SING 2). For the Comitative sen tences, each sentence set consisted of two versions of a prototype sentence: The probe names were always conjoined sub jects, but in one version they were the first mentioned participants (CONJ I), and in the other, they were the second-mentioned participants (CONJ 2).
Like the example in Table 3 , the Lexical Reciprocal sentence sets had the structure, NP1 and NP2 Ved Adverbial when the probe names were conjoined subjects , and NP1 Ved NP2 Adverbial when they were single subjects. The Reciprocal Anaphor sentence sets had the structure, NP1 and NP2 Ved {one another/each other} Adver bial when the probe names were conjoined subjects, and NP1 Ved NP2 Adverbial when they were single subjects. The Comitative sentence sets all had the structure, NP1 and NP2 Ved Adverbial.
Sixty-four lure sentences were con structed that resembled the experimental sentences in form: 24 resembled the Lexi cal Reciprocal sentences; 24 resembled the Reciprocal Anaphor sentences; and 16 resembled the Comitatives. Each experimen tal sentence was followed by a two alternative WH-question that asked about either the temporal or locative setting of the action, or the identity of one of the partic ipants. Four material sets were formed and 30 subjects were randomly assigned to each, so that each subject was exposed to only one version of a sentence set.
Results
The means of the subjects' average cor rect response times are graphed in Fig. 3 . For sentences containing Lexical Recipro cals, a 2 (subject status: conjoined vs. sin gle) by 2 (order of mention: first vs. second) ANOV A revealed only a reliable main ef fect of order of mention: First-mentioned participants were responded to 87 ms faster than second-mentioned participants, minF'(l,48) = 19.38, p < .0001. This effect did not interact with subject status; that is, the first-mentioned participants' advantage was equally strong regardless of whether they shared their subjecthood, minF'(l,77) = 0.02.
We observed the same pattern with the Reciprocal Anaphor sentences. These data are also shown in Fig. 3 Thus, the three sentence types behaved identically. In fact, an ANOV A conducted on the data from the three conjoined subject conditions, a 3 (sentence type: lex ical reciprocal vs. reciprocal anaphor vs. comitative) by 2 (subject status: conjoined vs. single) by 2 (order of mention: first vs. second) ANOV A, showed only a reliable main effect of order of mention, minF' (1 ,72) = 44.62, p < .00001. Neither the main effect of sentence type, minF'(2,79) = 1 .208, p > .25, nor any of its interactions were reliable, all minF' < 1.0.
These data allow three conclusions. First, there is a clear advantage for first mentioned participants. Second, this ad vantage is not attenuated when the first mentioned participants share their subject hood. And third, this advantage does not seem to arise from semantic role. Recall that we found no differences among the three types of sentences even though their verbs placed their participants in different semantic roles. In this way, Experiment 5 corroborates Experiments I and 2 in which we found that semantic role, namely agent versus patient, neither accounted for nor attenuated the first-mentioned participants' advantage. In Experiment 5, like Experi ments I and 2, only order of mention af fected participants accessibility.
EXPERIMENT 6
Our goal in Experiment 6 was again to separate the effects of order of mention from subjecthood. We did this by taking one of the participants out of its main clause and placing it in a complex prepositional phrase (Huddleston, 1984) . These complex prepositional phrases were either post posed, in which case the first-mentioned participants were the syntactic subjects, as in (6) Tina was evicted from the apartment because of Lisa.
Or the complex prepositional phrases were preposed, in which case the first-mentioned participants were not the syntactic sub jects, as in (7) Because of Lisa, Tina was evicted from the apartment.
So, in Experiment 6, we manipulated two variables: position of the complex preposi tional phrase, whether they were preposed versus postposed, and order of mention, whether the probe names were the first versus second-mentioned participants.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 72 under graduates at the University of Oregon.
Materials and design. We constructed 32 sentence sets; each comprised four ver sions of a prototype sentence. In two of the four versions, the complex prepositional phrases were preposed, and the probe names were either the first-(PRE I) or sec ond-(PRE 2) mentioned participants. In the other two versions, the complex preposi tional phrases were postposed, and the probe names were either the first-(POST I) or second-(POST 2) mentioned partici pants. We used four different complex prepositional phrases: because of, accord ing to, compared to, and except for. An example sentence set for each is shown in Table 4 .
Like the examples shown in Table 4 , the main clauses of the because of sentence sets had the structure, NP was Ved Adverbial. The main clauses of the according to sen tence sets had the structure, NP was an ADJ Agentive. The main clauses of the compared to sentence sets had the struc ture, NP was an ADJ Agentive. And, the main clauses of the except for sentence sets had the structure, NP was the ADJ Noun Adverbial.
Thirty-two lure sentences were con structed that resembled the experimental sentences in syntactic fo rm; an even num ber contained each of the four complex prepositional phrases. Each experimental sentence was followed by a two-alternative WH-question. For the because of and according to sentence sets, half the questions asked about the participant in the main clause (e.g., "Who caused someone to be evicted?" or "Who was an inspiring teacher?"), and half asked about the partic ipant in the complex prepositional phrases (e.g., "Who was evicted?" or "Who said someone was an inspiring teacher?" ). For the compared to sentence sets, one-fourth of the questions asked about the participant in the main clause (e.g. , "Who was the bet ter housekeeper?") , one-fourth asked about the participant in the complex prep ositional phrase (e.g., "Who was the worse housekeeper?' '), and the remaining half asked about the adjective in the main clause (e.g., "What kind of housekeeper was Tina! Lisa?"). For the except for sentence sets, all the questions asked about the nonpartic ipant noun phrase in the main clause (e.g., "What type of members were Tina and Lisa?" or "What were Tina and Lisa?").
Four material sets were formed and 18 subjects were randomly assigned to each. Within each material set, there were two PRE I, PRE 2, POST I, POST 2 type sen tences for each of the four complex prepo sitional phrases.
Results
The means of the subjects' average cor rect response times are graphed in Fig. 4 . A 2 (complex prepositional phrase position: pre vs. post) by 2 (order of mention: first vs. second) ANOVA revealed-in contrast to all our previous experiments-that the effect of order of mention was not reliable, minF'(l,51) = 1.57. However, there was an effect of the position of the prepositional phrase: Response times were 46 ms slower when the phrases were preposed than post posed, minF'(l,63) = 7.31, p < .01. Fur thermore, the interaction between the two variables was marginally reliable, Ft(l,71) = 5.756, p < .02 and F2( 1,31) = 3.337, p < .08. This interaction bore the fo llowing pat tern: When the prepositional phrases were preposed, the order of mention effect was reliable: First-mentioned participants were responded to 51 ms faster than second mentioned participants, minF'(l ,57) = 3.956, p < .05. This 51-ms advantage is in the same ballpark as the advantages we have observed in our other experiments. In contrast, when the prepositional phrases were postposed, only a nonsignificant 1-ms "advantage" occurred, both F1 and F2
ORDER OF MENTION
The results of Experiment 6 are surpris ing. It is the first time in 12 experiments (including those of Gernsbacher, 1988 ) that we failed to observe a main effect of order of mention. One explanation is that the ad vantage of first mention is actually an ad vantage of syntactic subjecthood. But the data do not support this explanation. If we compare the POST I response times to the PRE 2 response times, we see a significant 72-ms advantage for first mention-even though in both cases, the probe names were the subjects. In addition, if we get a mean of those two conditions, in which the probe names were subjects, and compare that mean to the mean of the remaining two con ditions, in which the probe names were not subjects, we actually find a 24-ms disadvan tage for subjects (i.e., M = 806 for nonsub jects, and M = 830 for subjects). Thus, it is unlikely that subjecthood is the factor un derlying the advantage of first mention.
Still, the lack of a main effect of order of mention is puzzling. Recall that there was an effect when the complex prepositional phrases were preposed, just not when they were postposed. So something about the post position attenuated the first-mentioned participants' advantage. If we expect the two postposed conditions to resemble the two preposed conditions, the data (;ell that doesn't match is the POST 2 condition (when the prepositional phrases were post posed, and the probe names were the sec ond-mentioned participants). In that condi tion, and that condition alone, the second mentioned participants' names were also the final words of their sentences. They were therefore the very last words to occur prior to the probe words. So perhaps the reason why we fai led to observe our typical first -mentioned participants' advantage in the postposed conditions is that recency (POST 2) was competing with primacy (POST 1).
We have no doubt that there are recency effects in sentence memory. In fact, an en tire literature documents that words from the most recently heard or read clause are more accessible than words from preceding clauses (Caplan, 1972; Chang, 1980; Jarveila, 1979) . However , we wonder whether these recency effects are as a long lived as the primacy effect we have ob served in our experiments.
We are also a little suspicious of this par ticular recency effect. In all of our other experiments, the second-mentioned partic ipants were-by definition-more recent than the first -mentioned participants; yet we never before witnessed an advantage of recency. Perhaps this particular recency ef fect is caused by the probe names being identical to, literally, the most recent words in their sentences. If so, the effect should disappear if we simply increase the interval between the offset of the sentences and the onset of the probe names.
ExPERIMENT 7
Method
Experiment 7 diffe red from Experiment 6 in the following way: in Experiment 6, the probe names appeared !50 ms after the off set of their sentences' final words. In Ex periment 7, the words Test Name appeared 250 ms after the offset of their sentences' final words. This warning signal remained on the screen for 750 ms. Then, 400 ms after it disappeared, a probe name appeared. So, in Experiment 7, each probe name occurred 1400 ms afte r the offset of the last word of its sentence. In all other respects, the two experiments were identical. Eighty subjects participated in Experiment 7.
Results
The means of the subjects' average cor rect response times are graphed in postposed, although in Experiment 7 this effect was much smaller, F1(1 ,79) = 5.779, p < .02, and F2( 1,31) = 4.322, p < .05, minF'(!,78) = 2.474, p > .10. But unlike Experiment 6, the effect of or der of mention in Experiment 7 was very reliable: First-mentioned participants were responded to 94 ms faster then second mentioned participants, minF'(!, 110) = 45.59, p < .00001. And again, the interac tion between phrase position and order of mention was reliable, minF'(1,75) = 6.643, p < .02.
However, the pattern of this interaction diffe red from the one in Experiment 6. In Experiment 7, the order of mention effect was reliable both when the complex prepo sitional phrases were preposed and post posed. But the effect was nearly doubled when the phrases were postposed: With the preposed phrases, first-mentioned par ticipants enjoyed a 69-ms advantage , minF'(! ,93) = 8.178, p < .01. With the postposed phrases, they enjoyed a 130-ms advantage, minF'( I ,99) = 44 .36, p < .0000 1. This larger effect is not an additional ad vantage of subjecthood. If we compare the two conditions in which the probe names were the subjects (namely, POST I and PRE 2), we still see a reliable 115-ms ad vantage for first mention. Similarly, if we compare the two conditions where neither probe name was the subject (namely, PRE I and POST 2), we also see a reliable 74-ms advantage for first mention. And fi nally, if we compare the two conditions were the probe names were the second-mentioned participants, but they were the subjects in one condition (PRE 2) but not the other (POST 2), we see only an unreliable 15-ms difference, minF'(!,7!) = 0.657.
If we expect the two postposed condi tions to resemble the two preposed condi tions, the data cell that does not match in the POST I condition (when the phrases were postposed, and the probe names were the first-mentioned participants). One de scriptive aspect of those sentences is that ORDER OF MENTION 713 their first-mentioned participants remain relatively independent throughout an entire clause. In fa ct, in both postposed condi tions, the complex prepositional phrase read almost like an afterthought tacked onto an already completed expression. So perhaps the larger effect of order of men tion that we observed for the POST I con dition is due to the first-mentioned partici pants seeming to be the sole participants through the majority of their sentences.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We will begin our discussion by review ing our findings. In Experiments I and 2, we fo und that the first-mentioned partici pants' advantage was not due to their being the semantic agents of their sentences. Rather, the advantage held even when the first-mentioned participants were patients. In Experiments 3 and 4, we fo und that the first-mentioned participants' advantage did not derive simply from their being the ini tial words in their stimulus sentences. Rather, the advantage depended on each participant's position relative to the other participants. In Experiment 5, the first mentioned participant's advantage was not attenuated when they shared subjecthood with the second-mentioned participants. In fac t, in Experiments 6 and 7, the advantage was not attenuated even when the first mentioned participants were no longer their sentences' syntactic subjects.
We conclude that the advantage of first mention does not arise from any of the lin guistic fac tors that we investigated.
1 We 1 We have been asked whether the effect of order mention is attributable to the first-mentioned partici pants being either their sentences' topics (Chafe, 1976;  Li & Thompson, 1976) (Chafe , 1976; Firbas , 1974; Giv6n, 1979 , Halliday, 1967 . However, opinions differ over which di mension initial mention codes and which function speakers and writers intend to ac complish when they select among the gram matical fo rms that involve different orders of mention. According to one perspective, initial mention codes importance and func tions to attract attention (Giv6n, 1986) . According to another perspective, fi rst mention codes givenness and functions to create a context for subsequent comprehen sion (Clark & Clark, 1977) .
Both perspectives are supported by stud ies employing a range of different experi mental tasks designed to simulate sentence production, fo r example, elicited sentence fo rmulation, oral sentence recall, sentence acceptability, sentence ratings, and sen tence verification (of pictures, for in stance). Those studies that have manipu lated importance via perceptual salience, were still more accessible. As for whether the first mentioned participants are centers, again the data from the conjoined-subj ect conditions of Experiment 5 suggest against the possibility as the first-mentioned participants in these constructions would fail the cri teria for being a center.
animacy, definiteness, or other markers have shown that important concepts are mentioned first (see reviews by Anisfe ld & Klenbort, 1973; Bock, 1982; and MacWhin ney, 1977) . Similarly, those studies that have manipulated givenness via explicit prior mention, verbatim or pictorial cueing, or implicit presupposition have shown that given concepts are mentioned first (see re views by Bates & MacWhinney, 1982; and Bock, 1982) .
Both perspectives are also supported by descriptive, linguistic studies of languages that allow a freer word order arrangement than English. For example, like English, the Uto-Aztecan language, Papago, has no case marking morphology on nouns; how ever, unlike English, Papago has no strongly preferred order of subject, object, and verb (Payne. 1987) . Even so, initial in formation-information preceding the verb--tends to be of two types: new infor mation that will be important in the subse quent discourse or old (given) information that appears in contrastive, fo cused, or in formation-question constructions. Thus, the Papago data, like the English data, sup port both the perspective that initial men tion codes importance and the perspective that initial mention codes givenness. In ad dition, the Papago data demonstrate that the use of initial mention to code these two pragmatically relevant dimensions is not re stricted to languages with rigid word order or nominal case marking (see also Sridhar, 1988) .
However, one cannot adopt the two per spectives simultaneously without entering into a paradox. That is, initial mention can only code importance and givenness simul taneously if one assumes that new informa tion is always less important or that impor tant information is always old . Both as sumptions seem unintuitive. Thus, the two perspectives conflict. As Bock (1982) points out, nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the exchange between Costermans and Hupet (1977) and Johnson Laird (1977) . Bock ( 1982) discusses a few resolutions to this conflict fr om the sentence produc tion point of view. We will not attempt to resolve this conflict fo r comprehension; in stead , we will only point out how our struc ture building account accommodates both functions. If first mention is selected in or der to signal importance, then the function is accomplished because-by virtue of be ing first mentioned-initial information gets represented at the core or fo undation of the structure. As we have mentioned before , this privileged position leads to greater ac cessibility, and presumably the goal of marking information as important is to gain this greater accessibility. On the other hand, if first mention is selected in order to signal givenness, then the fu nction is also accomplished because-by virtue of being first mentioned-initial information orga nizes the representation of subsequent in formation. That is, subsequent information get mapped onto the developing structure vis-a-vis the initial information . Presum ably, the mapping process proceeds more smoothly when new (subsequent) informa tion is being mapped onto given (initial) in fo rmation, rather than the other way around.
We are suggesting that although speakers and writers exploit grammatical forms to accomplish two diffe rent communicative fu nctions, one set of cognitive processes namely, those involved in structure build ing-is responsible for both desired effects.
We end by acknowledging another con flict in the literature. All of the experiments reported here appear to contradict another set of experiments, namely, those demon strating the well-known clause recency ef fe ct (Caplan, 1972; Chang, 1980; Von Eck hardt & Potter, 1983) . Those previous ex periments also used a probe recognition task. However, instead of finding a primacy effect, those experiments found a recency effect: Probe words were recognized more rapidly when they were from a most re cently heard or read clause. Gernsbacher, Hargreaves, and Beeman (1988) resolve this apparent conflict by investigating the time course of recognizing sentence partic ipants from first versus second clauses. Again, the structure building framework ac counts for the resulting data.
